

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

*Memo  
Chromo*

TO:

|          |           | ACTION | INFO | DATE | INITIAL |
|----------|-----------|--------|------|------|---------|
| 1        | DCI       |        | X    |      |         |
| 2        | DDCI      |        | X    |      |         |
| 3        | EXDIR     |        | X    |      |         |
| 4        | D/ICS     |        |      |      |         |
| 5        | DDI       | X      |      |      |         |
| 6        | DDA       |        |      |      |         |
| 7        | DDO       |        |      |      |         |
| 8        | DDS&T     |        |      |      |         |
| 9        | Chm/NIC   |        |      |      |         |
| 10       | GC        |        |      |      |         |
| 11       | IG        |        |      |      |         |
| 12       | Compt     |        |      |      |         |
| 13       | D/Pers    |        |      |      |         |
| 14       | D/OLL     |        |      |      |         |
| 15       | D/PAO     |        |      |      |         |
| 16       | SA/IA     |        |      |      |         |
| 17       | AO/DCI    |        |      |      |         |
| 18       | C/IPD/OIS |        |      |      |         |
| 19       | NIO       |        |      |      |         |
| 20       |           |        |      |      |         |
| 21       |           |        |      |      |         |
| 22       |           |        |      |      |         |
| SUSPENSE |           | _____  |      |      |         |
|          |           | Date   |      |      |         |

Remarks

Executive Secretary

3 Apr 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

25X1

SECRET

Executive Registry

85- 1448

3 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Development of New Art Form for  
Intelligence Memoranda

1. The new art form addressing alternative means of resolving specific problems is an interesting experiment which should be pressed further. I would like to see it tried on Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

2. The Suriname paper indicates a bleak outcome no matter how it is addressed. The Angola paper is more interesting and potentially useful. I am going to ask [ ] to see if he can give it a more lively and practical twist.

25X1

  
William J. CaseyDCI  
EXE 25X1  
REG

SECRET

SECRET

DDI #01682-85/1  
29 March 1985

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence

1. About a month ago, you asked that we experiment with a new kind of paper that would attempt to address a few key foreign policy problems with a view to laying out alternative means of resolution of those problems. Discussion of each alternative would explore how it might be formulated and the likely reaction to it. You suggested that we simply take an earlier Angola paper, and reformat it to see what it would look like using this approach.

25X1

2. Attached are two prototypes of such papers, one on Angola and the other on Suriname. I would be interested in your reaction to the approach. If you think it has merit, we could next tackle Afghanistan and perhaps Nicaragua.

25X1

3. My criticisms of the attached papers is that the alternatives put forward are pretty conventional and do not demonstrate very much creativity in looking at these problems. If this type of paper is to have real value, it seems to me we need to deal not only with the rather routine alternatives but try to dream up two or three that perhaps people haven't given serious attention to so far. This would be particularly true in Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

25X1

4. Again, your thoughts on this approach would be welcome.

25X1

*RS.*  
Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment:  
As Stated

SECRET

CL By Signer  
DECL OADR

SECRET [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

25X1

REF ID: A1682185 25X1

22 March 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

VIA: Director of Global Issues

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center/OGI

25X1

SUBJECT: Development of a New Art Form for  
Intelligence Memoranda [REDACTED]

25X1

1. The attached memoranda were prepared by the Instability and Insurgency Center in response to your request for a new art form that will help policymakers focus on resolutions to particular issues or problems. As we understand it, the inspiration for this project was a typescript memorandum, Angola: Impact of Alternative Regional Settlements, drafted by the Office of African and Latin American Analysis. [REDACTED]

25X1

2. In developing these two sample papers our primary objective is to provide the reader with a structured way of thinking about the costs and opportunities associated with pursuing specific policy sets. We applied our model first to the Angolan settlement issue, but felt the situation was unique given the complexity of this problem and the number of actors involved. In order to test the flexibility of new art form and further develop some of its elements, we prepared a second paper addressing the impact of alternative strategies the West could adopt toward Suriname. This version allows for a fuller discussion of the underlying conditions in a country, future directions a country could take, and the extent to which it is susceptible to foreign influence. To this end, it is more representative of future issues open to similar treatment. [REDACTED]

25X1

3. In drafting these papers, it quickly became evident that the simple act of thinking about issues in this way has stimulated analysts to be much more creative. On the whole we found the exercise stimulating and look forward to your reactions and comments on its utility. [REDACTED]

25X1

Attachments:  
As statedSecret [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

25X1  
25X1**ANGOLA: IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE REGIONAL SETTLEMENTS****PREFACE**

This memorandum explores alternative strategies that could lead to a resolution of the regional conflict involving Angola, UNITA, and South Africa. It seeks to provide the reader with an understanding of the basic forces at play in the region, sets out alternative strategies that could be employed to resolve the conflict, and assesses the extent to which the problem is susceptible to external influence. The format is purposely provocative; it is not intended to predict what may or may not occur. The paper discusses the viability of each potential course of action, but does not endorse any particular policy alternative. Rather, it provides a structured way of thinking about the costs and opportunities associated with each approach and some idea of what new openings or dangers might emerge if a given course of action were to be pursued.

25X1

**THE CURRENT SCENE**

UNITA insurgents have made steady gains in Angola's nearly 10-year civil war, despite being outnumbered and outgunned by the Cuban-and Soviet-supported Angolan Army. The insurgents have made good use of their advantages in quality of manpower and leadership to take and hold the military initiative.

25X1

We judge, however, that neither side is likely to gain a decisive advantage over the other in the coming year, although the intensity of the fighting probably will increase throughout the country. UNITA most likely will make some gains but not at the pace it has enjoyed in the past; nor will it be able to seize key positions the government chooses to hold and defend. Luanda's inventory of Soviet fighters has tripled in the past year, and Luanda's greater use of air superiority will pose growing problems for UNITA.

25X1

This relatively even match--despite the imbalance of forces--could be changed significantly by outside factors such as Namibian independence under UN Resolution 435 and some form of Cuban troop withdrawal or if the Luanda regime and UNITA initiate negotiations toward a reconciliation agreement. UN Resolution 435 states that following the arrival of a UN peacekeeping forces, South African troops would be confined to their garrisons and, in steps over a period of 12 weeks, would be reduced to a total of 1,500 men. At the end of seven months, elections would

SECRET

25X1  
25X1

SECRET

25X1

25X1

be held and the remaining South African contingent would depart. This would deprive UNITA of its main lines of outside support, eliminate South Africa as a deterrent to Angolan action, and open UNITA's base areas to Angolan attack. [REDACTED]

25X1

UNITA's military successes over the past two years also have forced the MPLA regime in Luanda to consider trying to end the fighting through negotiations. Although the MPLA has maintained a rigid public stance opposing talks with UNITA, reliable reporting makes it clear that considerable ferment continues within the party supporting national reconciliation. Many see a rapprochement as a device for ending the civil war, lessening Angola's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba, and opening the country to greater Western aid. [REDACTED]

25X1

Substantial resistance to talks remain, however, particularly among the mulato-hardliners and a large number of their black supporters throughout the government and military. Although the Soviet Union and Cuba appear staunchly opposed to any talks, the MPLA has repeatedly been advised to negotiate by various African neighbors, by countries in both Eastern and Western Europe, and by South Africa. [REDACTED]

25X1

## STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING THE CONFLICT

The following list of strategies is not intended to be exhaustive; other approaches could be constructed by combining elements from two or more of the strategies discussed below. Nor is the order in which they are presented intended to endorse the adoption of any particular approach. [REDACTED]

25X1

The four alternative approaches we examine for resolving the conflict involving Angola, UNITA, and South Africa are:

- o **Complete and Simultaneous Cuban Withdrawal With Implementation of UN Resolution 435.**
- o **Partial Cuban Withdrawal After UN Resolution 435 Is Implemented.**
- o **Withdrawal of All But a Small Residual Cuban Force in Conjunction with UN Resolution 435.**
- o **Some Form of Reconciliation Agreement involving Luanda and UNITA in Conjunction with UN Resolution 435. (S NF)**

SECRET

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

**IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS****Strategy 1: Simultaneous Withdrawal and UN 435**

Cuba withdraws all military personnel--combat troops, advisers, and technicians--from Angola over a period of twelve weeks in such a manner that the number of Cubans and South Africans in the region were essentially equal once the process got underway. [REDACTED]

25X1

Impact. Essentially the South African position first advanced in May 1982, this approach would be disastrous for the MPLA government. Luanda could not compensate for the loss of 25,000 Cuban troops defending key provincial centers, nor for the advisers and technicians that run Angola's war machine. [REDACTED]

25X1

UNITA would lose the deterrent value of South African forces stationed in Namibia and Savimbi's base areas would become vulnerable to sustained Angolan attack. UNITA also would lose access to South Africa as an easy and secure arms supplier, but would gain some propaganda advantage by claiming it now was battling the Luanda regime unaided by foreign supporters. [REDACTED]

25X1

Viability. Luanda and Cuba would oppose this approach because they believe it would lead to the collapse of the MPLA regime. Savimbi would be less resistant, calculating that he would have to strike quick and hard to settle the civil war before supply shortages cut into his capabilities. [REDACTED]

25X1

Other Considerations. Cuba and the Soviet Union would risk a major propaganda debacle if they were seen as unwilling to provide the necessary support to keep their friends in power. [REDACTED]

25X1

South Africa might view the departure of all Cubans as a golden opportunity to invade Angola in force--as it did in 1975--and install Savimbi as the new head of government in Luanda. They almost certainly would find ways to continue assisting UNITA covertly, but the level of support would fall. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Strategy 2: Partial Cuban Withdrawal After UN 435**

In accordance with UN 435, South Africa withdraws its Air Force from Namibia and reduces its troop strength to 1,500 men. Cuba then withdraws 20,000 military personnel over a three-year period. [REDACTED]

25X1

Impact. This proposal was advanced by Luanda in November and apparently was vetted by the Cubans and the Soviets. Angola could still depend on a substantial force--10,000 by Luanda's count and 15,000 by our estimates--to defend the key provincial



SECRET

25X1  
25X1

centers and provide essential technical and advisory support. Cubans troops probably would be taken mostly from southwestern Angola were they had helped defend against South African incursions and where UNITA is not particularly active. Soviet weapons deliveries would continue, major urban areas would be protected, and economically vital oil production would be secured. [REDACTED]

25X1

UNITA would lose the support necessary to sustain the conflict at its present levels and South African protection of its sanctuary in the southeast. Savimbi probably would be able to secure at least minimal levels of support from other donors to continue the conflict for some years, but the trend would be [REDACTED]

25X1

Viability. Luanda and the Cubans would support this approach wholeheartedly and Moscow somewhat grudgingly. Both UNITA and Pretoria almost certainly would reject it. [REDACTED]

25X1

Other Considerations. Lacking a South African support structure, Savimbi might be compelled to extend his base areas into Zambia and seek sanctuary for his troops there. [REDACTED]

25X1

With UNITA on the run, Soviet and Cuban efforts to consolidate the Marxist Leninist regime in Luanda would receive much greater attention. [REDACTED]

25X1

ANC base areas in Angola would be more secure and the guerrillas could bring considerably more pressure on South Africa. [REDACTED]

25X1

### Strategy 3: Smaller Cuban Residual Force and UN 435

Cuba withdraws its forces at a faster pace--perhaps within two years--leaving behind only a small residual force of 3,000 to 5,000 troops. South African forces are withdrawn from Namibia in accordance with UN 435. [REDACTED]

25X1

Impact. UNITA would lose the South African deterrent and sustaining supply within a matter of weeks and probably would opt to intensify the conflict in hopes of achieving a military victory. Luanda, however, would have substantial Cuban forces on hand for at least one year and probably could contain a major thrust by UNITA. [REDACTED]

25X1

Nevertheless, we believe that Luanda's dependence on Cuban manpower is greater than UNITA's reliance on a South African presence in Namibia, and we expect over time that Savimbi's forces would begin to prevail as the Cuban troop withdrawal neared completion. UNITA would be able to concentrate its forces on the few remaining areas of government strength and probably could take effective control over most of the country. [REDACTED]

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Viability. South Africa and UNITA might accept this package provided they were assured of satisfactory verification and implementation procedures. Luanda is more likely to balk at the deal, arguing that it would postpone the MPLA's demise by no more than a year or two. MPLA leaders might be persuaded to go along, however, if they believed that they could cheat on the timing or extent of the Cuban force reduction. [REDACTED]

25X1

Other Considerations. Luanda might try to compensate for the loss of Cuban troops, for example, by forming a "civilian construction corps" populated mostly by able-bodied young Cubans. It also might seek Western assurances of greatly increased economic--and possibly military--assistance as the price for its acceptance. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Soviet Union and Cuba would retain substantial influence over the Luanda Government at least initially, but the door would be opened to an enhanced Western role and presence. Pressure also would mount on the US Government to afford diplomatic recognition to the MPLA Government. [REDACTED]

25X1

With UNITA's hopes of achieving a military victory bolstered, Savimbi would press his friends hard for additional support and start to rely more on supply routes through Zaire. Even if Mobutu kept this a low-key operation, it probably would not remain secret. His involvement, in turn, might prompt the Soviet Union and Cuba to step up support to anti-Mobutu rebels. [REDACTED]

25X1

#### **Strategy 4: Reconciliation and UN 435**

The MPLA Government enters into negotiations with UNITA. Both sides agree to stop fighting, a coalition government is formed, and provision is made for the reduction and eventual withdrawal of all Cuban and South African military personnel from Angola. The talks take place in the context of a regional peace settlement that allows for a phased withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia in accordance with UN Resolution 435. [REDACTED]

25X1

Impact. Successful talks would end the civil war, lessen Luanda's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba, and pave the way for greater Western aid and improved relations with Angola's neighbors. A decision to enter into negotiations with UNITA also would appease those within the MPLA government who reportedly may be pushing for a rapprochement, including former members of the Catete group, an amorphous group of Army officers known as the Young Captains, and a few of President dos Santos' closest advisers. [REDACTED]

25X1

On the other hand, reconciliation would entail major risks for Luanda. Influential mulatto hardliners and a sufficient number of their black supporters in the party, military, and

SECRET [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

government appear to believe that a compromise with UNITA-- especially one that enhances the stature of UNITA's charismatic leader Jonas Savimbi--could rapidly lead to an UNITA takeover and their own physical demise. They believe that UNITA can eventually be defeated militarily and they might move to oust dos Santos if he tried to engage UNITA in reconciliation talks. [REDACTED]

25X1

Savimbi would view reconciliation talks as a means of removing the Cuban presence from Angola and legitimizing his claim to represent the political aspirations of the bulk of the Angolan people. He would risk losing direct South African support to his movement and foreclose the possibility of gaining a military victory over the Luanda regime. His willingness to sit down at the same table with the enemy also might cost him the support of some of his more radical advisers. [REDACTED]

25X1

The talks could conclude with agreement on partition or federation, with UNITA in control of the southern half of the country. This would allow UNITA to consolidate its regional power free from Angolan and Cuban military pressure. Such an arrangement would significantly bolster Angola's case for diplomatic recognition and pave the way for increased Western assistance, thereby strengthening the Luanda government. [REDACTED]

25X1

Viability. Serious talks between the Luanda government and UNITA are not likely unless the MPLA's military situation deteriorates substantially. We doubt that Luanda's agreement to talk by itself would be enough for Savimbi to accept a package with a sizeable residual Cuban force since the talks could fail and leave Savimbi militarily disadvantaged. Moreover, some MPLA leaders believe they can avoid talks through a military victory, and they would never acquiesce to a complete withdrawal of Cuban military personnel. Although MPLA leaders probably would find the idea of a federation more appealing, they would be inclined to reject it as well. [REDACTED]

25X1

Cuba would not reject reconciliation out of hand given the economic and political costs of maintaining a substantial Cuban military presence in Angola and their doubts that Luanda could ever defeat the insurgents militarily. Moscow, however, would adamantly oppose any compromise with UNITA. It views Savimbi as a major threat to the consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist government in Angola and believes that his inclusion in a coalition government would severely undermine Soviet and Cuban influence. Cuba almost certainly would acquiesce to Soviet desires on this matter. [REDACTED]

25X1

South Africa, however, would be a forceful proponent of reconciliation, largely because most key officials in the South African government believe a rapprochement would offer the charismatic Savimbi a shortcut to taking power. Savimbi's

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

capture of Luanda also would facilitate their grand strategic plan of surrounding Namibia with a ring of "moderate" buffer states. [REDACTED]

25X1

Other Considerations. Partition or federation would put Western governments in a much better position to provide military and economic assistance to Savimbi. Both UNITA and the MPLA, however, probably would view partition or a federation as a holding action until the battle for total control of the country is fought. Under such circumstances, UNITA's ability to attract external military support once civil war broke out would improve dramatically in that it had already established itself as a legitimate government. [REDACTED]

25X1

On the other hand, pro-Soviet hardliners in Luanda might rebel against dos Santos and install a more radical Marxist-Leninist regime. They probably would seek Soviet support before making their move and might promise Moscow increased access and extensive base rights in Angola. [REDACTED]

25X1